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Criminal Law

by Franklin J. Hogue*
and Laura D. Hogue**

I.

INTRODUCTION

As in previous years, we cannot comment on every development in
criminal law in Georgia that occurred this past year through appellate
opinions and statutory changes. We cannot even footnote all of them.
Instead, we have chosen cases that are the most important or the most
interesting or those that may have the widest application to the future
course of criminal practice and procedure. We hope this Article is useful
to our colleagues who practice criminal law.
II.

PRETRIAL ISSUES

Demurrers: Constitutionalityof the ChargingDocuments

A.

In Briggs v.State,' Briggs was caught trying to sell fifty-two individually wrapped compact discs containing reproductions of recorded
material. He raised two challenges to the statute under which he was
charged, Official Code of Georgia Annotated ("O.C.G.A.") section 16-8-
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60(b). 2 That statute prohibits the possession and distribution of sounds
or images without a label bearing the name and address of the
transferor of the sounds or images.3 Briggs asserted that (1) the statute
was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad and (2) it was preempted by
federal copyright law.4 He lost on both arguments.
With respect to vagueness, Briggs argued that the statute failed to
make it clear to whom the phrase "'transferor of the sounds or visual
images"' referred.6 Though the opinion does not say it, we can infer
that Briggs's vagueness argument focused on the meaning of transferor-specifically, whether the original conveyor of the sounds or images
was the transferor, such as the artist who recorded the songs, or
whether Briggs himself was the transferor because he copied those songs
to another disc. Vagueness of that sort would render a criminal statute
unconstitutional because it would leave uncertain what act was
prohibited and who was prohibited from doing it, which would violate
the guarantee of due process.7 The Georgia Supreme Court, applying
the "reasonable definiteness" standard and reading the statute in its
context, concluded that the article containing the sounds or images-the
compact disc-must contain the name and address of the original
conveyor of the sounds or images to the disc.8 But what if Briggs had
put his own name and address on the discs in his possession and argued
that he was the one who conveyed the sounds or images to the disc in
question, even while conceding that he copied the sounds or images from
another disc that bore the name and address of the original conveyor of
those sounds or images to that disc? It is safe to conclude that he would
still have lost on his vagueness argument.
Briggs's argument that the statute was overbroad focused on the
statute's chilling effect on protected speech.9 Briggs's argument, as we
can infer from the opinion, was that the statute prohibited one from
remaining anonymous by omitting one's name and address from the
label of a disc.1 ° The supreme court held that the statute did not
regulate pure speech, but instead it regulated speech plus commercial
conduct.1" Thus, the statute was narrowly tailored to achieve the

2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.

Id. at 329, 638 S.E.2d at 293; O.C.G.A. § 16-8-60(b) (2007).
O.C.G.A. § 16-8-60(b).
Briggs, 281 Ga. at 329, 638 S.E.2d at 293.
Id. at 332, 638 S.E.2d at 295.
Id. at 330, 638 S.E.2d at 294 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-8-60(b)).
Id.
Id.
Id. at 331, 638 S.E.2d at 294.
See id.
Id.
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legitimate state interest12 in protecting the entertainment industry from
piracy and bootlegging.
Briggs's federal preemption argument-that the state law was
equivalent to the federal copyright law, and thus, preempted by the
copyright law-also failed. 13 The court applied "Nimmer's 'extraelement' test": If the state law requires any element beyond those
elements required under federal copyright law-17 U.S.C. § 1061'then the federal law does not preempt state law. 5 The supreme court
compared the state law and the federal law and concluded that the
federal law did not preempt state law because the Georgia statute
contains the element that the article being sold contain a label that
includes the name and address of the transferor of the sounds or images,
an element that federal copyright law does not require.16
The decision drew a dissent from Justice Melton, in which Chief
Justice Sears joined. 7 Both justices concluded that the statute was
indeed overbroad because it "prohibits a substantial amount of constitu8
tionally-protected speech, including anonymous political speech."
Justices Hunstein 19 and Carley" wrote two separate special concurring opinions because they both thought that the majority failed to
acknowledge the overbreadth of the statute; however, they each thought
the majority appropriately narrowed the statute by limiting "its
application to media that has been stolen or 'pirated."'2 1 Thus, it
remains a crime in Georgia to copy music, for example, from its original
labeled disc to an unlabeled
disc, then attempt to offer it for sale, sell it,
22
or otherwise distribute it.
B.

Search and Seizure

1. Police-Citizen Encounters. Each year we review search-andseizure law by picking a few of the many cases in the reporting period

12. Id.
13. Id. at 332, 638 S.E.2d at 295.
14. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (2000).
15. Briggs, 281 Ga. at 332, 638 S.E.2d at 295 (citing 1 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID
NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 1.01[B][1], at 1-13 to -14 (2005)).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 335, 638 S.E.2d at 297 (Melton, J., dissenting).
18. Id.
19. Id. at 332, 638 S.E.2d at 295 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
20. Id. at 334, 638 S.E.2d at 296 (Carley, J., concurring specially).
21. Id. at 333, 638 S.E.2d at 295 (Hunstein, J., concurring).
22. See generally id. at 329, 638 S.E.2d at 293.
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that highlight search-and-seizure issues and the state of the law in this
area. This year is no exception. We start with a "tier-one" case.
"According to Terry v. Ohio,"2" Judge Blackburn wrote for the
majority in Black v. State,2 4 "police-citizen encounters are generally
categorized into three tiers: consensual encounters; brief investigatory
stops, which require reasonable suspicion; and arrests that must be
supported by probable cause."2" In this case, a drug agent received an
anonymous tip, as well as information from an informant, that drugs
could be found at Eddie and Pamela Black's house. After watching the
house for a few hours, the agent saw a truck leave with three males in
it. The agent followed the truck and called for backup. The truck pulled
into a gas station, as did a couple of the backup patrol cars. Rodney
Black, Eddie and Pamela's grown son, got out of the truck and walked
into the gas station's store. Less than a minute later, Rodney walked
out the opposite door of the store and headed for the nearby woods.26
The agent then requested that one of the patrol officers ask Rodney
what he was doing. The officer repeatedly attempted to do so, but
Rodney told the officer that the officer had no right to speak to him and
refused to answer the officer's questions. Thinking Rodney was about
to flee, the officer grabbed Rodney's arm, and Rodney became belligerent.
The officer arrested him for obstruction. In the ensuing search incident
to arrest, the officer found methamphetamine in Rodney's pocket.2
Rodney then talked about having drug paraphernalia back at the
house, which led the officers to search the house. At the house, Rodney's
parents talked to the officers, which led to a "consensual" search of the
whole house, the discovery of more methamphetamine, more arrests, the
convictions of Rodney's parents, and this appeal.28 The court of appeals
agreed with Eddie and Pamela that the search of their home, because it
was based on Rodney's illegal arrest and the search of his pockets, was
tainted by "several illegalities, beginning with the unlawful detention of
their son and culminating in the agents' unlawful entry into their
home."29 Because Rodney's arrest and search was illegal, everything
that flowed from it was illegal. The interesting issue here is how close

23. Black v. State, 281 Ga. App. 40, 43, 635 S.E.2d 568, 571 (citing Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1 (1968)).
24. 281 Ga. App. 40, 635 S.E.2d 568 (2006).
25. Id. at 43, 635 S.E.2d at 571 (citing Terry, 392 U.S. at 21; State v. Harris, 261 Ga.
App. 119, 581 S.E.2d 736, 739 (2003)).
26. Id. at 40, 635 S.E.2d at 570.
27. Id. at 41, 635 S.E.2d at 570.
28. Id.
29. Id. at 42, 635 S.E.2d at 571.
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a first-tier encounter is to a second-tier encounter and how the former
led to the result in this case, but the latter would not have.
Consider:
In a first-tier encounter, police officers may approach citizens, ask for
identification, and freely question the citizen without any basis or
belief that the citizen is involved in criminal activity, as long as the
officers do not detain the citizen or create the impression that the
citizen may not leave.30
The citizen may respond to such an approach by an officer at this level
by ignoring the officer and walking away.31 This would not constitute
obstruction of the officer, and any arrest and search subsequent to this
cold reception to the officer would be illegal.3 2
But note how close a second-tier encounter is to a first-tier:
During a second-tier encounter, the police officer conducts a brief
investigative Terry stop of the citizen. In this level, a police officer,
even in the absence of probable cause, may stop persons and detain
them briefly, when the officer has a particularized and objective basis
for suspecting the persons are involved in criminal activity. To stop a
citizen, the officer must possess more than a subjective, unparticularized suspicion or hunch. The officer's action must be justified by
specific and articulable facts which, taken together with rational
inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that intrusion, and the
officer must have some basis from which the court can determine that
the detention was neither arbitrary nor harassing.33
The question for the citizen, and ultimately for the courts, perhaps, is
this: Doesn't the mere approach of a law enforcement officer to a citizen,
the officer's request for identification, and whatever questions the officer
may ask-"What are you doing here?", "Where are you going?", "Where
did you just come from?", and many other similar ones-by its nature
create the impression in the citizen's mind that he or she may not leave
and that he or she must produce identification and explain his or her
comings and goings? If the first tier is determined by the citizen's belief
that he or she is free to leave and if the second tier is determined by the
officer's possession of articulable suspicions about the citizen-suspicions
of which the citizen may not be aware-then a citizen with an honest
belief that he or she is free to leave will be arrested for obstruction and
be searched incident to that arrest if he or she unwittingly begins to

30.
31.
32.
33.

Id. at 43, 635 S.E.2d at 571.
Id., 635 S.E.2d at 571-72.
Id.
Id., 635 S.E.2d at 572.
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walk away, not knowing that the officer is able to articulate some
suspicion that the citizen is up to no good.
This is what makes Black an interesting case. The officer, according
to Judge Blackburn, had no articulable suspicion even though the officer
saw Rodney leave a house under surveillance for alleged drug activity,
walk away from the officer swiftly when approached, and belligerently
insist that the officer had no right to question him.34 Two judges
dissented, seeing reasonable articulable suspicion to detain Rodney
where the majority saw none.3 5 For the dissenters, the totality of the
circumstances amounted to a reasonable articulable suspicion:
(1) an anonymous informant and a confidential informant had
indicated that the Black residence might conceal a methamphetamine
lab; (2) three young men departed from that house; (3) in direct
response to seeing marked police cars pull into the gas station, Rodney
stopped what he was doing and entered the gas station, then in less
than thirty seconds he exited the opposite side and began walking
"very briskly" toward the wood line behind the store; (4) as an officer
called to talk to Rodney, Rodney kept moving faster toward the wood
line, in what the officer described as a "speedwalk.""
Both the majority and the dissent noted all of the same facts surrounding Rodney's arrest and subsequent search, but disagreed over whether
those facts added up to a reasonable suspicion. While that alone is
common, in this time when the Fourth Amendment37 privacy protections are beset on every side-from national security concerns used to
justify widespread snooping to arguments that a modern professionalized
police force supports less stringent application of the exclusionary
rule-it is refreshing to see a case like Black.
But try to accord Black with this next case, decided just a couple of
months earlier than Black by the same court of appeals, although by a
different judge. In State v. Williams, 38 Judge Miller upheld a trial
court's suppression of marijuana (as evidence) on the grounds that
Williams's putative consent for the officer to search his pockets, in which
Williams possessed a "blunt," was not consensual because the officer was
holding a stun gun on Williams, which Williams thought was a
firearm. 39 Police officers had received a tip, the anonymity or reliability of which the opinion does not address except to say that it came from

34. Id. at 46, 635 S.E.2d at 573-74.
35. Id. at 48-51, 635 S.E.2d at 575-77 (Adams, J., dissenting).
36. Id. at 49, 635 S.E.2d at 576.
37.

U.S. CONST. amend. IV.

38. 281 Ga. App. 187, 635 S.E.2d 807 (2006).
39. Id. at 188, 635 S.E.2d at 808.
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a concerned citizen, that people were smoking marijuana in a local park
after dark. Over the next several days, officers went to the park but
caught no one smoking marijuana. Then, returning to the park one
more day, this time in an unmarked truck, they saw Williams and
several other young people on and around a swing set.4 °
The officers testified that they identified themselves, then Williams
jumped out of the swing, walked away at a brisk pace, but stopped when
they ordered him to do so. Williams testified that he began walking
away when he saw an unmarked truck pull up, not knowing that it
contained police officers, but that he stopped walking as soon as the
officers identified themselves.4 1 While this factual dispute was left
unresolved and does not seem to matter to the analysis of this case, the
trial court ruled for Williams because the officers had failed to articulate
a reasonable suspicion of illegal activity, and the trial judge noted it was
"very significant' that the officers' initial testimony omitted any
reference to one of them pulling out his stun gun."4 2 The officer only
mentioned the gun, clarifying that it was his stun gun and not his
firearm, when recalled to the stand after Williams and one of his friends
testified that the officer had a gun pointed at Williams when he
requested that Williams consent to a search of his person.43
Here is the interesting part, however, in light of what we read in
Black. Judge Miller, after reviewing the three principles of appellate
review of a judge's findings of facts and conclusions of law when he or
she sits as the trier of facts,44 said this: "Here, despite the trial court's
claim that the officers had no basis to suspect that Williams was
committing a crime at the time they conducted their search, flight is a
circumstance sufficient to give an articulable suspicion of illegal
activity."45 Judge Miller went on to say: "Assuming that Williams' act

40. Id. at 187-88, 635 S.E.2d at 808.
41. Id. at 188, 635 S.E.2d at 808.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Id.
"First, the judge sits as the trier of facts. The trial judge hears the evidence, and
[the judge's] findings based upon conflicting evidence are analogous to the verdict
of a jury and should not be disturbed by a reviewing court if there is any evidence
to support it. Second, the trial court's decision with regard to questions of fact
and credibility must be accepted unless clearly erroneous. Third, the reviewing
court must construe the evidence most favorably to the upholding of the trial
court's findings and judgment."
Id., 635 S.E.2d at 809 (brackets in original) (quoting State v. Brown, 278 Ga. App. 457, 45960, 629 S.E.2d 123, 125 (2006)).
45. Id. at 189, 635 S.E.2d at 809 (citing Tuggle v. State, 236 Ga. App. 847, 849, 512
S.E.2d 650, 652 (1999)).
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of walking away from the officers provided them with such a suspicion,"
which Judge Miller did assume, "they were authorized to conduct a brief,
Terry-type stop in which they could restrain Williams for further brief
questioning."" Remember that Terry-stops occur at the second tier in
the familiar three-tier police-citizen encounter schematic. In Judge
Miller's analysis, therefore, one wonders how a first-tier encounter could
ever occur.
Note that Judge Miller did not say that the officers possessed an
articulable suspicion that Williams was engaged in unlawful activity-which would justify the second-tier brief detention-because of any
facts in their possession that they could articulate when they came upon
Williams on the swing in the park. Indeed, all the officers knew at that
point was that some concerned citizen had complained that people were
smoking marijuana in the park after dark. So if the officers did not
possess any reasonable articulable suspicions about Williams when they
emptied out of their unmarked truck to descend upon him and his
friends, why is it that Williams's departure, brisk or not, is not an action
that he can legally take as a citizen protected by the Fourth Amendment? Why is it necessarily a suspicious act that then gives police
officers the right to detain him for a more intrusive Terry-type secondtier encounter, complete with a demand for identification, a pat-down
search to determine whether he was armed and dangerous, and
questions about what he was doing, where he was going, and what was
in his pockets? We fail to see how Williams's actions are any different
from Rodney Black's actions. The only distinction that helped Williams
prevail on his motion to suppress is that the officer pulled a stun gun on
Williams before Williams "consented" to a search, which meant that
there was no valid consent in the first place.
2. Search Incident to Arrest. In Lindsey v. State,4" a case of first
impression, the court of appeals was called upon to determine whether
a search was lawful when the defendant was arrested pursuant to a civil
order under O.C.G.A.' section 37-7-41(b), 49 a statute authorizing the
court to order that any peace officer could arrest a person named in the
order for delivery to involuntary treatment for alcohol or drug dependency.5" A probate court had issued an orde:, pursuant to this statute, to
any peace officer to arrest Phillip Lindsey and deliver him to a mental

46. Id. (citing Tuggle, 236 Ga. App. at 849, 512 S.E.2d at 652).
47. See generally id. at 189-90, 635 S.E.2d at 809-10.
48. 282 Ga. App. 644, 639 S.E.2d 584 (2006).
49. O.C.G.A. § 37-7-41(b) (1995).
50. Id.

2007]

CRIMINAL LAW

health facility or medical center emergency room because he was a drug
addict who needed help. A police officer then found Lindsey in a bar and
asked him to step outside. Lindsey complied, the officer explained the
court order to him, and then handcuffed him. Then, following department protocol, the officer patted Lindsey down for weapons, did not find
any, then emptied Lindsey's pockets and found a small baggie containing
methamphetamine. The officer then put Lindsey in his patrol car and,
instead of taking him to a mental health facility or a medical center
emergency room, took him to jail and charged him with a violation of
O.C.G.A. section 16-13-30,"' part of the Georgia Controlled Substances
Act.52 The State then argued at the suppression hearing that the
search was incident to a lawful arrest, authorized by O.C.G.A. section
17-5-1," 3 and thus, the evidence should not be excluded from trial.54
The trial court agreed and denied Lindsey's motion.55
The court of appeals reversed, citing, first, O.C.G.A. section 17-4-1,56
which states that "'a person is under arrest whenever his liberty to come
and go as he pleases is restrained, no matter how slight such restraint
may be.' 5 7 If a person is under arrest, then law enforcement "may
reasonably search the person arrested," including his pockets for
possession of drugs.58 At this point in the analysis, it would be difficult
to conclude that Lindsey was not under arrest and that he could not
have been searched." "But," the court observed, "not every taking of
a person into custody by a peace officer constitutes an arrest."" Citing
O.C.G.A. sections 17-4-40, 6' 17-4-20,62 and 17-4-60,63 the court noted
that an arrest is an arrest only when the person is taken into custody
upon probable cause to believe that he or she has violated the penal
laws, which is to say that he or she is believed to have committed a
crime. 4 In this case, the officer apprehended (not arrested) Lindsey

51. Lindsey, 282 Ga. App. at 644-45, 639 S.E.2d at 586-87; O.C.G.A. § 16-13-30 (2007).
52. O.C.G.A. §§ 16-13-1 to -114 (2007).
53. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1 (2004).
54. Lindsey, 282 Ga. App. at 645, 639 S.E.2d at 587.
55. Id.
56. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-1 (2004).
57. Lindsey, 282 Ga. App. at 646, 639 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting State v. Nelson, 261 Ga.
246, 247, 404 S.E.2d 112, 113 (1991)).
58. O.C.G.A. § 17-5-1(a); see also United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973).
59. See generally Lindsey, 282 Ga. App. 644, 639 S.E.2d 584.
60. Id. at 646, 639 S.E.2d at 587.
61. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-40 (2004).
62. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-20 (2004).
63. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-60 (2004).
64. Lindsey, 282 Ga. App. at 646-47, 639 S.E.2d at 587-88 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 17-4-40,
-20, -60).
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upon the authority of a court order issued pursuant to a civil statute
authorizing "protective custody, not a criminal arrest."65 Lindsey was
not taken into custody based upon probable cause to believe that he had
violated a criminal statute but based upon a finding that he presented
a health risk to himself or others because of his drug addiction.66 Thus,
the court interpreted this civil statute for the first time by holding that
"a peace officer executing an order to apprehend pursuant to [O.C.G.A.
sections] 37-3-41(a) and 37-7-41(b) does not thereby arrest the person
to
67
be examined such that a search incident to arrest is authorized."
The court noted that an officer apprehending a citizen pursuant to a
court order issued under authority of this statute could still conduct a
limited search of the person for weapons.6" In this case, the officer
patted down Lindsey but felt nothing resembling a weapon.69 Thus, the
search should have ended there.7 °
The court went an additional step by holding that an inventory search
of a person's belongings when apprehended pursuant to a civil protective
order is, likewise, not authorized. 7' An inventory search, like a search
incident to arrest, is authorized when the citizen has been arrested and
is on the way to jail.7 ' A search of an arrestee's belongings rests upon
several governmental interests, and among those are keeping drugs and
weapons out of the jail and preventing false claims over lost or stolen
property. 7' But when the police simply give the apprehended citizen a
ride to a mental health facility or medical center emergency room so that
he or she can get help for a drug or alcohol problem, no police inventory
of his or her pockets, bags, or other belongings is justified.74
C.

Voluntariness of Statements

A fundamental tenet of language, logic, and law is that a word gets its
meaning from its context. This is no more apparent than in Spence v.
State,75 where even Webster's Third New International Dictionary
made an appearance in the court's opinion regarding the definition of

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 646, 639 S.E.2d at 587.
See id. at 646-47, 639 S.E.2d at 587-88.
Id. at 647, 639 S.E.2d at 588 (citing O.C.G.A. §§ 37-3-41(a), -7-41(b)).
Id. at 647 n.7, 639 S.E.2d at 588 n.7.
Id. at 645, 639 S.E.2d at 586.
See id. at 649, 639 S.E.2d at 589.
Id. at 648, 639 S.E.2d at 588.
See id., 639 S.E.2d at 588-89.
Id.
Id. at 648-49, 639 S.E.2d at 589.
281 Ga. 697, 642 S.E.2d 856 (2007).
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"confidential."76 Lemuel Spence was in custody for the rape of a woman
and the stabbing death of another person unrelated to the rape."
During his interrogation by Detective Quinn, after having read and
signed the Miranda warnings," the following exchange occurred
between Quinn and Spence:
Quinn: Just you and me, just you and me.
Spence: I'm just scared when I go to jail, everybody gonna know I said
something.
Quinn: Lem, ain't nobody saying nothing, this is confidential. Nobody
knows what you're there for. What are you talking about? I don't
understand.
Spence: I mean, not [what I'm] there for. I mean I don't want anybody
to think that I (unintelligible).
Quinn: No, that's not going to happen. This is confidential what we're
doing right here. Do you understand that? This is confidential ....
Spence: .. .what happened.
Quinn: Tell me what happened down there, Lem. What happened
down there.79
Spence then went on to incriminate himself in the murder.8 °
The trial court denied Spence's motion to exclude his incriminating
statement because, in the judge's view, "confidential," as used by Quinn,
meant that Spence's statement would be kept from other people in the
jail and did not amount to a false promise not to use it against him in
court.8 " On appeal, the trial court's denial was reversed, and Justice
Carley dissented, agreeing with the trial judge that in its context, Quinn
merely promised Spence that he would not tell his jail mates that he
confessed to the crimes charged, not that his statement would not be
used against him in court.8 2 Further, he castigated the majority for
ignoring the standard for determining admissibility of confessions and
substituting its reading of the meaning of "confidential" for the trial
judge's understanding of it in the totality of the circumstances-all
without ever finding that the trial judge was clearly erroneous.8 3 He
also noted that Quinn had not lied to Spence; he did not cross "'the line
into the sort of lying that deprives a defendant of the knowledge

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 700 & n.7, 642 S.E.2d at 858 & n.7.
Id. at 697, 642 S.E.2d at 857.
See generally Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
Spence, 281 Ga. at 698, 642 S.E.2d at 857 (brackets and alterations in original).
Id.
Id. at 699, 642 S.E.2d at 858.
Id. at 702, 642 S.E.2d at 860 (Carley, J., dissenting).
Id. at 704, 642 S.E.2d at 861.
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essential to his ability to understand the nature of his rights and the
consequences of abandoning them."'' 4 So how did the majority read
confidential differently?
The majority concluded that Quinn did not qualify his statement that
his conversation with Spence was confidential to mean that Quinn would
not tell Spence's jail mates but that he would tell the court, thus leading
Spence to reasonably understand "that their interview was confidential
as an unqualified statement that what Spence told Quinn would be kept
confidential between the two of them, and would not be disclosed to
anyone else."85 The court was persuaded by the rationale in Hopkins
v. Cockrell, 6 where an interrogating officer told the defendant that
"'their conversation was confidential telling [the defendant], "This is for
me and you. This is for me. Okay. This ain't for nobody else."' '' 7 In
addition, the court cited Foster v. State," a case in which the court
excluded a defendant's confession "after he was told repeatedly that it
was not going to hurt 'a thing,' and that it would be 'as much for your
benefit as ours."'8 9 The court noted that in Foster it held that "'[an
accused must be warned that anything he says can and will be used
against him in court. Telling him that a confession is not going to hurt
and, on the contrary, will benefit him as much as the police, is not
9°
consistent with the warnings required by Miranda."'
We side with the majority because, having represented hundreds of
defendants in our combined thirty-two years of lawyering, it was
reasonable for Spence to believe that Quinn's promise of confidentiality
was unqualified, because every incarcerated person knows that whatever
happens in court circulates like wildfire through the jail. Nothing that
happens in a public courtroom in a criminal case is confidential. Not
only will other inmates talk about what they see and hear there, so will
jailers who transport prisoners between jail and court, not to mention
the publication of courtroom events in newspapers and on the evening
news that most inmates are watching each night in jail. The lesson for
Quinn and all law enforcement officers is clear: Read the Miranda
warnings to the suspect, ask if the suspect understands them, and have
him or her sign a form containing them and verifying that he or she

84. Id. at 703, 642 S.E.2d at 861 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Hopkins
v. Cockrell, 325 F.3d 579, 584 (5th Cir. 2003)).
85. Id. at 699-700, 642 S.E.2d at 858 (majority opinion).
86. 325 F.3d 579 (5th Cir. 2003).
87. Spence, 281 Ga. at 699, 642 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Hopkins, 325 F.3d at 584).
88. 258 Ga. 736, 374 S.E.2d 188 (1988).
89. Id. at 742, 374 S.E.2d at 194.
90. Spence, 281 Ga. at 699, 642 S.E.2d at 858 (quoting Foster, 258 Ga. at 742, 374
S.E.2d at 193).
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understands them. If the suspect chooses to waive them, then say
nothing at all during the interview to convey even the slightest
impression that anything the suspect says will not be used to incriminate him or her. It's that simple. Solving crimes, especially heinous
ones, is extremely important, but solving them at the expense of
venerable constitutional rights that protect all of us exacts a price too
great to pay.
Right to Waive Jury Trial and Demand Bench Trial
9
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution ' guaran92
Over a century
tees the right to a trial by jury in a criminal case.
ago, Georgia recognized that an accused could forego that right and put
the issue before the judge without a jury.93 Over sixty years ago,
Georgia established that while a defendant may waive his or her right
to a jury trial, the defendant did not have the right to a bench trial
without the acquiescence of the trial court. 94 In this reporting period,
the Georgia Supreme Court went one step further, holding that it is not
just the court that has to acquiesce to the defendant's waiver of a jury
trial, but the State must acquiesce as well.9"
In Zigan v.State,96 the defendant sought to waive his right to a jury
trial on the charge of involuntary manslaughter and allow the court to
try him. The State objected, and the trial court denied the defendant's
The supreme
request but granted a certificate of immediate review.
[to a
consent
to
prosecution
of
the
"the
refusal
that
court concluded
dethe
deny
but
to
no
choice
with
court
the
trial
left
trial]
bench
98
the
surprising
reach
court
the
supreme
did
rationale
By
what
mand."
decision to extend the veto power over a defendant's waiver of his right
to a jury trial from the trial judge to the prosecutor? This is how the
majority did it: (1) "[T]he ability to waive the right to a jury trial [is]
not the same as the power to demand a bench trial."9 9 That is because
°°
(2) State
waiving a right is different from demanding a privilege.
law already holds that a defendant cannot waive a unanimous verdict
unless he or she gives express and intelligent consent and the prosecuD.

91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.

U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
Id.
See, e.g., Logan v. State, 86 Ga. 266, 12 S.E. 406 (1890); O.C.G.A. § 1-3-7 (2000).
Palmer v. State, 195 Ga. 661, 669, 25 S.E.2d 295, 300-01 (1943).
Zigan v. State, 281 Ga. 415, 417, 638 S.E.2d 322, 324 (2006).
281 Ga. 415, 638 S.E.2d 322 (2006).
Id. at 415, 638 S.E.2d at 323.

98. Id. at 417, 638 S.E.2d at 324.
99. Id. at 416, 638 S.E.2d at 323 (citing Palmer, 195 Ga. at 661, 25 S.E.2d at 296).
100. Zigan, 281 Ga. at 416, 638 S.E.2d at 323.
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tion consents.' 0 ' The Georgia case in which this rule was established
cites a United States Supreme Court case for the rationale employed
there, in which the Supreme Court held that no federal right exists to
demand a bench trial. 10 2 (3) Because Glass v. State10 3 adopted the
principles enunciated in Patton v. United States,"°4 it follows, the
Georgia Supreme Court reasoned, that applying Glass to Zigan "requires
affirmance of the trial court's denial of appellants' demand for a bench
trial."10 5
Chief Justice Sears dissented, saying that she did not see anything "in
Georgia law that requires that the State have a veto power over a
defendant's request for a bench trial."0 6 She agreed with the premise
in the majority's argument-"a defendant does not have the right to
unilaterally demand that a trial court conduct a bench trial"° 7-but
parted ways with the majority's view that the trial court was insufficient
by itself to safeguard the traditional importance of a jury trial and that
it needed the prosecution to become the final arbiter. 0 8 A right that
has been promulgated for the benefit of the individual accused citizen
now cannot be waived in Georgia without the consent of the State, even
when the trial court agrees with the defendant that he or she may waive
this right.'0 9
Not only does this decision rest on shaky historical ground, but it is
also weak with logical fallacy as well. Nothing in logic requires the
court to draw from Glass and apply to Zigan the premise that the State
must acquiesce in a defendant's waiver of a unanimous verdict to the
defendant's waiver of a jury trial. The court supported this conclusion
by reasoning that because the 1983 Georgia Supreme Court, when Glass
was decided, supported its decision concerning unanimous verdict waiver
by quoting the rationale in Patton, the U.S. Supreme Court's 1930
opinion, the 2006 Georgia Supreme Court must now adopt that same
1930 rationale and extend it to the question of whether the State, too,
should be allowed to veto a defendant's waiver of his or her right to a
jury trial."10 But this conclusion does not necessarily follow. The court

101. Id. (citing Glass v. State, 250 Ga. 736, 737, 300 S.E.2d 812, 813 (1983)).
102. Glass, 250 Ga. at 737, 300 S.E.2d at 813 (citing Patton v. United States, 281 U.S.
276, 312 (1930)).
103. 250 Ga. 736, 300 S.E.2d 812 (1983).
104. 281 U.S. 276 (1930).
105. Zigan, 281 Ga. at 417, 638 S.E.2d at 324.
106. Id. at 418, 638 S.E.2d at 324 (Sears, C.J., dissenting).
107. Id. (citing Palmer, 195 Ga. at 668-69, 25 S.E.2d at 300).
108. Id., 638 S.E.2d at 324-25.
109. Id. at 417, 638 S.E.2d at 324 (majority opinion).
110. See generally id. at 415-17, 638 S.E.2d at 323-24.
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could have just as easily and authoritatively refused to extend the veto
power beyond the judge. Nevertheless, the law in Georgia is now that
a defendant cannot waive his right to a jury trial and put his fate before
a judge unless both the judge and the prosecutor agree to let him do it
and, even more, unless the prosecutor agrees to it even if the judge has
already approved the waiver.'
E.

Double Jeopardy

The long-standing law in Georgia was that when a jury proceeds to a
verdict without first having been sworn, that verdict is a nullity."2
Until this reporting period, all of the reversals and retrials of such null
verdicts occurred in cases in which the defendant was convicted. But
what happens if the defendant is acquitted? As Thomas Alan Spencer
found out, consider it to be an expensive mock trial; the verdicts are just
as null as the cases in which defendants were convicted." 3
Jeopardy attaches in a jury trial when the jury is both impaneled and
sworn. 114 In Spencer v. State,"' the jury was impaneled-twelve
jurors were selected to hear the case-but not sworn. 1 6 The jury
heard evidence, then acquitted Spencer of malice murder, though it
convicted him bf felony murder and other charges. Spencer argued that
his acquittal of malice murder by his unsworn jury should bar a retrial
Not so, ruled the
on that charge based upon double jeopardy."'
Georgia Supreme Court."' The oath to the petit jury is mandatory.1 '9 "When, as in this case," wrote the supreme court in Spencer, "a
trial jury proceeds without this mandatory oath, the statutory requirement becomes jurisdictional in character, involving considerations of
public policy."12 ° The public policy at issue is whether a citizen can be
tried by an unlawful tribunal. The obvious answer is no-we do not
want kangaroo courts determining our liberty-and because an unsworn
jury is nothing more than a collection of citizens who can do whatever
it wants with the evidence presented to it, such a jury's verdict is of no
account. We cannot help but wonder, though, whether the jurors in
Spencer's case in fact conducted themselves in any way different than

111. Id.
112. Slaughter v. State, 100 Ga. 323, 324, 28 S.E. 159, 161 (1897).
113. Spencer v. State, 281 Ga. 533, 534, 640 S.E.2d 267, 268 (2007).
114. Alexander v. State, 279 Ga. 683, 685, 620 S.E.2d 792, 794-95 (2005).
115. 281 Ga. 533, 640 S.E.2d 267 (2007).
116. Id. at 533, 640 S.E.2d at 267-68.
117. Id. at 533-34, 640 S.E.2d at 268.
118. Id. at 534, 640 S.E.2d at 268.
119. Id.
120. Id. (citing Slaughter, 100 Ga. at 326, 28 S.E.2d at 159).
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they would have had they been given the statutory oath. But even so,
the public policy reasons for this bright-line rule make eminent sense.
F

Conflict of Interest

In Burns v. State, 2 ' the Georgia Supreme Court declined to establish a rule that a conflict of interest should be presumed when attorneys
from the same public defender's office represent co-defendants in a joint
trial.122 The court based this conclusion on the well-established rule
that no presumption of a conflict of interest exists when one attorney
represents multiple defendants in a single case.' 23 If a defendant
objects to his or her public defender based upon the fact that a codefendant is being represented by another public defender from the same
office, the objecting defendant must show the trial court that the
potential conflict imperils his or her right to a fair trial.'2 4 Burns
attempted to do that by arguing that his co-defendant's defense was
antagonistic to his defense because at a previous trial that ended in a
mistrial, his co-defendant's public defender expressed indifference about
the outcome of Burns's case, as did Burns's lawyer about the codefendant's fate, emphasizing that the two defendants faced separate
verdicts and that the co-defendant's lawyer did not care what happened
to Burns.'25
Burns incorrectly characterized this indifference as
antagonistic defenses.'2 6 The court concluded that this was not an
antagonistic defense, but "nothing more than mutual expressions of
indifference by counsel over the outcome of the criminal charges against
the other party."'27 Therefore, the court did not reach the question
"whether public defenders should be automatically disqualified or be
treated differently from private law firm attorneys when actual or
possible conflicts arise in multiple defendant representation cases."'2
In this time of flux in the indigent defense delivery system-when
funding is at a crisis and costs increase even more when conflict counsel
must be appointed-expect this unreached question to arise one day
soon. Also, expect to see more multiple-defendant representation from
the circuit public defenders' offices.

121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

281 Ga. 338, 638 S.E.2d 299 (2006).
Id. at 340, 638 S.E.2d at 301.
Id.; see also Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1980).
Burns, 281 Ga. at 340, 638 S.E.2d at 301.
Id. at 339 & n.1, 638 S.E.2d at 300 & n.1.
Id. at 340, 638 S.E.2d at 301.
Id. at 341, 638 S.E.2d at 301.
Id.
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In Odum v. State,'29 the public defender's office undertook the
representation of Johnnie Odum, who had been charged with attempted
murder and other related crimes. Odum became dissatisfied with the
representation of his assistant public defender, Kathleen Jennings. He
said so in open court at a bond hearing, then refused to speak to two
other assistant public defenders who attempted to take over the
representation from Jennings. Odum
then filed a federal lawsuit against
13
Jennings and her entire office.
Jennings moved to withdraw, pursuant to Uniform Superior Court
Rule 4.3,1'31 asserting a nonwaivable conflict of interest based upon
Odum's lawsuit. The trial court denied the motion, but granted an
application for interlocutory appeal. On appeal, Odum argued that
O.C.G.A. section 17-12-22,132 a statute that became effective January
1, 2005, as part of the Indigent Defense Act, 133 granted the public
defender independent authority to determine when a conflict of interest
exists and thereby divests the trial court of its authority to make an
evaluation of such putative conflicts and deny motions to withdraw when
made by the public defender. 3 1 In essence, therefore, Odum's position,
as stated by Jennings, was that the statute conflicted with the superior
court rule, and because statutes trump rules, the trial135 court abused its
discretion in denying Jennings's motion to withdraw.
The court of appeals, interpreting O.C.G.A. section 17-12-22 for the
first time, concluded that no such conflict between the statute and the
rule existed. 136 The statute, the court held, makes it incumbent upon
the public defender to identify conflicts at the outset of the representation and gives the public defender the authority to refuse to represent

129.
130.
131.
132.

283 Ga. App. 291, 641 S.E.2d 279 (2007).
Id. at 291-92, 641 S.E.2d at 280.
GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 4.3.
O.C.G.A. § 17-12-22 (2004). In pertinent part, O.C.G.A. section 17-12-22 provides
(a) The council shall establish a procedure for providing legal representation in
cases where the circuit public defender office has a conflict of interest. This
procedure may be by appointment of individual counsel on a case-by-case basis or
by the establishment of a conflict defender office in those circuits where the
volume of cases may warrant a separate conflict defender office.
(c) The circuit public defender shall establish a method for identifying conflicts
of interest at the earliest possible opportunity.

Id.
133.
134.
135.
136.

O.C.G.A. §§ 17-12-1 to -128 (2004 & Supp. 2007).
O.C.G.A. § 17-12-22.
Odum, 283 Ga. App. at 293, 641 S.E.2d at 281.
Id.
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the defendant and to refer him or her to conflict counsel.137 But once
the representation has begun, the statute does not leave the authority
in the hands of the public defender to be the sole arbiter of whether a
conflict renders continued representation impossible.13
Rather, at
that point, the public defender would have to move to withdraw, as
Jennings did, and the court, pursuant to its authority, could determine
whether the conflict would render the representation ineffective and
necessitate the appointment of conflict counsel. 3 9 If this were not the
rule, the court of appeals reasoned, then defendants could indefinitely
delay trials by simply filing lawsuits against their appointed counsel,
40
causing withdrawal after withdrawal with no oversight by the court.
In Odum's case, even though the court of appeals disagreed with
Odum's interpretation of O.C.G.A. section 17-12-22, it did agree that the
trial court abused its discretion by denying Jennings's motion to
withdraw.'
Having to defend themselves against Odum's federal
lawsuit was sufficient to create a conflict of interest between Odum and
the public defender's office and, thus, should have ended the representa42
tion. 1
III.
A.

GUILTY PLEAS

Defendant's Right to Withdraw

In Kaiser v. State,'1 43 Alan Kaiser pleaded guilty to more than sixty
counts of drug manufacturing, possession, and dispensation of controlled
substances. In addition to ten years of prison time, followed by twenty
years on probation and fines and fees, the negotiated plea also contained
a term prohibiting Kaiser from practicing medicine in Georgia or any
contiguous state during his sentence. But at the sentencing hearing, the
judge modified this term to prohibit Kaiser
from ever practicing medicine
44
in Georgia or the contiguous states.

137. Id.
138. Id. at 293-94, 641 S.E.2d at 281.
139. See Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475, 487 (1978).
140. Odum, 283 Ga. App. at 294, 641 S.E.2d at 281.
141. Id., 641 S.E.2d at 282.
142. Id. at 295, 641 S.E.2d at 282.
143. 285 Ga. App. 63, 646 S.E.2d 84 (2007). The authors reported the earlier version
of this case, Kaiser v. State, 275 Ga. App. 684, 621 S.E.2d 802 (2005), in last year's article.
See Franklin J. Hogue & Laura D. Hogue, Criminal Law, 58 MERCER L. REv. 83, 107
(2006).
144. Kaiser, 285 Ga. App. at 63, 646 S.E.2d at 85.
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Kaiser moved the trial court to modify the prohibition against ever
practicing medicine because it was an illegal sentence. It was illegal,
Kaiser argued, because it was indeterminate, which violates O.C.G.A.
section 17-10-1(a)(1)." 4' The trial court denied Kaiser's motion, but the
court of appeals reversed, vacating Kaiser's sentence in its entirety.'46
Three days after the case had been sent back to the trial court for resentencing, but before re-sentencing had occurred, Kaiser moved to
withdraw his plea to several counts in the indictment. The trial court
re-sentenced Kaiser according to the terms of the original negotiated
plea anyway, then dismissed Kaiser's motion to withdraw his plea on the
ground that it was filed after the term of court in which the original
sentence was imposed.'47 This then set up the following conundrum
for the court to solve.
First, O.C.G.A. section 17-7-93(b) 4 8 provides that "[a]t any time
before judgment is pronounced, the accused person may withdraw the
plea of 'guilty' and plead 'not guilty.""49 "The phrase 'at any time
before judgment is pronounced,"' the court explained, "means at any
time before the judge orally pronounces sentencing." 50 Thus, after
entering a plea but before being sentenced, a defendant has "an absolute
right" to withdraw his or her plea.' 5'
Second, "[A] defendant must file a post-sentencing motion to withdraw
a guilty plea in the same term in which he was sentenced."'52 After
that, the court lacks jurisdiction to entertain the motion, and
the
5 3
defendant is left only with the option of filing a habeas petition.
Third, "[A] finding of a void sentence, following a guilty plea, does not
automatically discharge the defendant from his plea," but rather "the
proper procedure is to return the defendant to the trial court for the
imposition of a legal sentence."" 4
Now we have Kaiser's dilemma: what happens when a defendant
wishes to withdraw a guilty plea following a void sentence but before resentencing outside the term of court in which the defendant entered the
plea and was given the void sentence? The court cited two contradictory

145. Id.; O.C.G.A. § 17-10-1(a)(1) (Supp. 2007).
146. Kaiser, 285 Ga. App. at 63, 646 S.E.2d at 85.
147. Id. at 64, 646 S.E.2d at 85-86.
148. O.C.G.A. § 17-7-93(b) (2004).
149. Id.
150. Kaiser, 285 Ga. App. at 64-65, 646 S.E.2d at 86 (citing State v. Germany, 246 Ga.
455, 456, 271 S.E.2d 851, 852 (1980)).
151. Id. at 65, 646 S.E.2d at 86.
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Id.
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lines of authority-the "Mullins line,"155 which supports Kaiser's
position by holding that "[w]here the sentence is void, a valid sentence
may be imposed by the court, until which time the defendant stands as
1 6
though convicted but not sentenced,""
and the "Jarrett line, 157
which supports the State's position by holding that when a defendant
moves to withdraw a plea after imposition of a void sentence and when
such motion has been made outside the term of court in which the void
sentence was imposed, the only action allowed is to re-sentence the
defendant by giving him a legal sentence. 55
The court solved this dilemma by siding with the Mullins line because
the reasoning in Mullins "gives effect to each of the three overlapping
principles" while the Jarrett line "completely ignores a defendant's
statutory right to withdraw his plea prior to sentencing."159 As a
result, a host of cases in the Jarrett line, including Jarrett, were
overruled. 160
B.

State's Right to Withdraw

The short answer to the question of whether the State can withdraw
its plea offer when the trial court accepts a guilty plea but announces its
intention to reject the negotiated sentence in favor of the defendant is
62 Harper agreed to plead
no.161 In State v. Harper,'
guilty to robbery, reduced from armed robbery, in exchange for a joint recommendation of five years in prison. The trial court accepted the plea but
rejected the negotiated sentence, instead the court gave Harper five
years, one to be served in confinement, the balance on probation, but
that one year in confinement to be suspended upon completion of a boot
camp program. 163 Miffed by the court's "'complete disregard of the

155. Id., 646 S.E.2d at 87 (citing Mullins v. State, 134 Ga. App. 243, 214 S.E.2d 1
(1975)).
156. Id. at 66, 646 S.E.2d at 87 (quoting Mullins, 134 Ga. App. at 243, 214 S.E.2d at
2).
157. Id. at 67, 646 S.E.2d at 88 (citing Jarrett v. State, 217 Ga. App. 627, 458 S.E.2d
414 (1995)).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 68, 646 S.E.2d at 88.
160. Id. at 68-69, 646 S.E.2d at 89 (overruling Woodson v. State, 267 Ga. App. 636, 600
S.E.2d 717 (2004); Mann v. State, 264 Ga. App. 631, 591 S.E.2d 495 (2003); Farist v. State,
249 Ga. App. 320, 547 S.E.2d 618 (2001); Brasuell v. State, 243 Ga. App. 176, 531 S.E.2d
732 (2000); Baldwin v. State, 242 Ga. App. 205, 529 S.E.2d 201 (2000); Lewis v. State, 229
Ga. App. 827, 494 S.E.2d 678 (1997); Jarrett,217 Ga. App. 627, 458 S.E.2d 414).
161. See State v. Harper, 279 Ga. App. 620, 621, 631 S.E.2d 820, 821 (2006).
162. 279 Ga. App. 620, 631 S.E.2d 820 (2006).
163. Id. at 620, 631 S.E.2d at 820.
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plea agreement,"' the State appealed.'6 4 The court of appeals, noting
that the State conceded in its brief that Georgia law gives only the
defendant the right to withdraw his guilty plea and does not confer such
a right upon the State, was unmoved by the State's argument that it too
should have this right.'6 5 Imagine if the State had such a right: The
State would then wrest exceptional power from the judiciary to fashion
sentences. It would mean that almost any time that a judge, in his or
her wisdom, temperance, and moderation, sought to impose a more
lenient sentence than even the defendant agreed to in the negotiations
with the State, the court could not do so. The State could simply
withdraw the plea offer and revert to a charge, assuming one is
available, that requires the judge to give a greater sentence.
IV
A.

THE STATE'S CASE IN CHIEF

Hearsay

1. Res Gestae Exception. As trial attorneys, we observe more
confusion by lawyers and even judges about the hearsay rule and all its
many exceptions than any other rule of evidence. An oft-used exception
by the State is the "res gestae" exception to the hearsay rule. As most
lawyers 166
learned in law school, res gestae is Latin for "things done" or
"events."
We also learned that in Georgia's rules of evidence, it
covers a wide array of present sense impressions, excited utterances, and
other spontaneous declarations made roughly contemporaneously with
an event. Introduced into American law from English common law in
the nineteenth century and codified in Georgia's first book of statutes,
the Code of 1860,167 this exception has grown more obscure over its
long history. Indeed, the Federal Rules of Evidence, enacted in 1975 and
now adopted by forty-two states, not including Georgia, did away with
this vague term, replacing it with specific exceptions identified in Rules
803(1), (2), and (3).168

164. Id.
165. Id. at 621, 631 S.E.2d at 821.
166. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1335 (8th ed. 2004).
167. GA. CODE of 1860 § 3696 (Seals 1861).
168. FED. R. EVID. 803(1)-(3). The Evidence Study Committee of the State Bar of
Georgia has proposed new evidence rules for Georgia, which would track the federal rules
and, in doing so, would eliminate the term "res gestae" and adopt the more specific rules
found in Federal Rules of Evidence 801 (1), (2), and (3), codifying them at O.C.G.A. section
24-8-803(1), (2), and (3). The Board of Governors of the State Bar will vote on the proposed
change in the fall of 2007 and, if approved, will present them to the legislature for
consideration. See State Bar of Georgia, http://gabar.org/news/proposed-new-georgia-rules
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Under the current res gestae rule at O.C.G.A. section 24-3-3,169 the
Georgia Supreme Court, in Orr v. State,170 reversed a trial court for
admitting into evidence the hearsay statement of an unknown third
party on a 911 tape.17 ' The unknown third party was not the caller
and could be heard stating the defendant's name as the caller reported
a shooting, which turned out to be a murder.172 The person named by
the unknown third party was ultimately identified in a lineup by
another witness and convicted of the murder.173 The admission of the
tape containing the utterance of Orr's name was reversible error because
there was no evidence to show whether the third party spoke Orr's name
because he or she was a witness to the shooting and saw Orr do it, or
whether the third party simply stated Orr's name as an expression of
the declarant's opinion or a conclusion.174 In other words, there was
no way to know whether the declarant was uttering Orr's name from
personal knowledge or not.' 75 It is safe to say that even under the new
proposed rules of evidence, this case should have, and probably would
have, come out the same way. In our view, the proposed rules to be
considered by the State Bar of Georgia in Fall 2007, modeled as they are
on the federal rules, would be a welcome change to Georgia's current
rules of evidence.
2. Right to Confrontation. In one of the more important decisions
in criminal law in recent years, the United States Supreme Court held,
in Crawford v. Washington,'7 6 that "[wihere testimonial evidence is at
issue ... the Sixth Amendment demands what the common law
required: unavailability and a prior opportunity for cross-examination."' 77 The Georgia Court of Appeals was called upon to apply this
interpretation of the Sixth Amendment guarantee to the right to
confront and cross-examine one's accusers in Dickson v. State. 17 In
that case, Richard Dickson got into a fight with his brother, Barry,
which led to Richard's stabbing Barry to death. The father of the two
men, Grady Dickson, witnessed the stabbing as he attempted to break

_of evidence (last visited Aug. 25, 2007).
169. O.C.G.A. § 24-3-3 (1995).
170. 281 Ga. 112, 636 S.E.2d 505 (2006).
171. Id. at 113-14, 636 S.E.2d at 507-08.
172. Id. at 112, 636 S.E.2d at 507.
173. Id.
174. Id. at 113, 636 S.E.2d at 507-08.
175. Id., 636 S.E.2d at 507.
176. 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
177. Id. at 68.
178. 281 Ga. App. 539, 636 S.E.2d 721 (2006).
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up the fight. Grady gave a statement to an investigator, in which he
characterized events in a way that undermined Richard's later selfdefense theory at trial. Grady did not testify at Richard's trial, however,
because Grady had died. But he did testify at Richard's bond hearing
prior to the trial. In fact, Richard had called him as a witness to say
that if the court were to grant a bond to Richard, Grady and his wife
would not have felt threatened by him. On cross-examination, the State
asked Grady about the specific details of the stabbing, but on re-direct,
Richard asked further questions related to bail and did not question
Grady about the stabbing. 7 9
Richard went to trial, where he presented his self-defense theory. The
State, however, was allowed to have the investigator who had interviewed Grady play for the jury the audiotape of that interview. The trial
court reasoned that this hearsay was admissible because Grady was
obviously unavailable, and Richard had an opportunity to cross-examine
Grady at his bond hearing.' 80
The court of appeals concluded that this was error and, because it was
harmful error, reversed Richard's conviction.'
It did so by holding
that Richard did not have a meaningful opportunity to cross-examine
Grady on substantially the same issue that arose at trial because the
bond hearing involved different issues than those at trial.'82 We find
this case to be instructive, as a reminder to lawyers and trial courts, not
only for its correct application of Crawford and its protection of Richard's
Sixth Amendment right under the United States Constitution, but more
for the distinction it draws between issues at a bond hearing and issues
at trial and their differing standards.
The issues at a bond hearing involve the significant risks identified in
O.C.G.A. section 17-6-1(e):' 8 3 flight, danger to others or property, risk
of committing a new felony, and risk of intimidating witnesses.'84 The
test at a bond hearing for release on bail is whether the accused shows
the court that he or she does not pose one of these risks in significant
proportions.8 5 The issue at trial, of course, is whether the defendant
is guilty of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt. It should go
without saying that this standard "is significantly more demanding."8 6
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Id. at 539 & n.1, 636 S.E.2d at 722-23 & n.1.
Id. at 539, 636 S.E.2d at 723.
Id. at 541-42, 636 S.E.2d at 724.
Id. at 540, 636 S.E.2d at 723.
O.C.G.A. § 17-6-1(e) (2004).
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Dickson, 281 Ga. App. at 540, 636 S.E.2d at 723.
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The Georgia Supreme Court also faced the question for the first time
of whether the requirements of the Sixth Amendment's right to confront
8 7
and cross-examine one's accusers applies at a preliminary hearing."
8
In Gresham v. Edwards,"' an appeal from the denial of a petition for
writ of habeas corpus, the court said no. 8 9 Gresham's petition for
bond was denied, so he filed a habeas petition against the sheriff. It,
too, was denied, which brought his appeal to the Georgia Supreme
Court. At all stages, he raised the issue that he had been denied his
right to confront and cross-examine his accusers at his preliminary
hearing when the investigator in his case gave hearsay testimony from
a variety of witnesses about a variety of things.' 90 The magistrate
court, presiding over the preliminary hearing, overruled his hearsay and
constitutional objections because "hearsay has long been admissible in
determining the existence of probable cause."191
On appeal, Gresham reasoned that because a preliminary hearing is
a "critical stage" in the prosecution of a citizen, the Sixth Amendment
right to confront and cross-examine applies, just as the Sixth Amendment right to assistance of counsel applies.' 92 Gresham further argued
that this has become all the more true since the United States Supreme
Court decided Crawford.'93 The Georgia Supreme Court disagreed,
however, emphasizing throughout its analysis of the issue that
Crawford, with its historical overview of this Sixth Amendment right,
made it clear that this right applies at trial.' Because a preliminary
hearing only determines "probable cause to believe the accused guilty of
the crime charged, and if so to bind him over for indictment by the
grand jury,"'9 5 whereas a trial determines guilt or innocence, the right
to confront and cross-examine one's accusers does not apply.196

187. See Gresham v. Edwards, 281 Ga. 881, 644 S.E.2d 122 (2007).
188. 281 Ga. 881, 644 S.E.2d 122 (2007).
189. Id. at 883, 644 S.E.2d at 124.
190. Id. at 881-82, 644 S.E.2d at 123.
191. Id. at 882, 644 S.E.2d at 123 (citing Banks v. State, 277 Ga. 543, 544, 592 S.E.2d
668, 670 (2004)).
192. Id. (citing Coleman v. Alabama, 399 U.S. 1, 10 (1970)).
193. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 124.
194. Id. at 882-83, 644 S.E.2d at 124.
195. State v. Middlebrooks, 236 Ga. 52, 54, 222 S.E.2d 343, 345 (1976).
196. Gresham, 281 Ga. at 883, 644 S.E.2d at 124.
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V.

A.

113

DEFENSE CASE

Impeachment of the Defendant

In 2005 the Georgia legislature enacted O.C.G.A. section 24-984. 1,19 intending to establish guidelines for the use of criminal
In
convictions to impeach witnesses or defendants who testify. 9 '
Adams v. State, 99 the trial court allowed the State to impeach the
defendant in a burglary case with a misdemeanor conviction for theft by
receiving stolen property on the theory that the prior crime involved
"dishonesty" within the meaning of O.C.G.A. section 24-9-84.1(a)(3). ° °
Until Adams, the Georgia Court of Appeals and Georgia Supreme Court
had not yet identified which crimes involve dishonesty within the
meaning of this statute. Therefore, the courts had not identified which
crimes could be used to impeach based on this theory. After a thorough
analysis of the topic, the court of appeals concluded that misdemeanor
theft by receiving stolen property does not involve dishonesty and, thus,
does not fit within the permissible prior convictions that may be used to
impeach a testifying witness, including a defendant. °1
The court arrived at this conclusion by noting that the new statute
adopted the language of Federal Rule of Evidence 609(a)(2). 20 2 Given
that starting point for its statutory analysis, the court looked to federal
appellate court interpretation of this federal rule as persuasive authority
and observed that the Eleventh Circuit has concluded that theft is not
a crime involving dishonesty. 203 The court noted that every other
circuit in the federal system, except the Fourth Circuit (which apparently has not ruled on the issue), had reached the same conclusion.20 4
The various states that have addressed the issue have not come out so
uniformly as the federal circuits, but 'Im]any of these courts have
adopted the reasoning of the federal courts that a crime of dishonesty is
one that bears on a witness's propensity to testify truthfully or that
involves some element of deceit or falsification." 2 5 While the court in
Adams concluded that the trial court erred in admitting the evidence of
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200.
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204.
205.

O.C.G.A. § 24-9-84.1 (Supp. 2007).
See id. § 24-9-84.1(a).
284 Ga. App. 534, 644 S.E.2d 426 (2007).
Id. at 537, 644 S.E.2d at 430.
Id. at 540, 644 S.E.2d at 432.
Id. at 537, 644 S.E.2d at 430 (citing FED. R. EVID. 609(a)(2)).
Id. (citing United States v. Sellars, 906 F.2d 597, 603 (11th Cir. 1990)).
See id. at 538 & n.25, 644 S.E.2d at 431 & n.25.
Id. at 539, 644 S.E.2d at 431.
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the prior theft conviction to impeach the defendant, the error was
harmless because it was not "highly probable" that the error contributed
to the guilty verdict.2"6
This case marks an important change in the rules of evidence
regarding impeachment. Prior to the enactment of O.C.G.A. section 249-84.1, "a witness could be impeached by proof of general bad character
or by proof that the witness had been convicted of a crime of moral
turpitude."2 7 Theft was considered to be a crime of moral turpitude
and, thus, could be used to impeach a witness. 2 8 The change in
language in the new statute persuaded the court that the legislature no
longer intended for such to be the case.20 9
Judge Smith concurred in the majority's holding-the conviction was
affirmed-but wrote separately to say that in his view, the majority
violated Georgia's rule of statutory construction and that he would have
included theft as a crime of dishonesty. 210 For his part, he would not
have looked at how the federal courts interpret their own Rule 609(a)(2),
as did the majority, because "Georgia courts must look first to their own
direct instructions with regard to statutory interpretation."211 Citing
O.C.G.A. section 1-3-1(b) 21 2 and Fleming v. State"3 for those instructions, Judge Smith asserted that the court should not resort to federal
statutes and cases when the Georgia statute is unambiguous. 4 To
him, the new statute is unambiguous because dishonesty is a common
word, the meaning of which everyone knows, and, also for him, theft
necessarily involves dishonesty.2 15
In addition, the new statute
mentions "making a false statement" or dishonesty, a disjunctive
construction, and under the majority's view, he asserts, dishonesty
becomes redundant in the new statute if it means "failing to testify
truthfully in court," because that is essentially what "making a false
statement" includes as well.21 6
The majority, however, stated that crimes of dishonesty, like the
federal courts interpret the phrase, "are limited to those crimes that bear

206. Id. at 541, 644 S.E.2d at 433.
207. Id. at 539, 644 S.E.2d at 432; see also Sapp v. State, 271 Ga. 446, 448, 520 S.E.2d
462, 464 (1999).
208. Adams, 284 Ga. App. at 539, 644 S.E.2d at 432.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 541, 644 S.E.2d at 433 (Smith, J., concurring).
211. Id.
212. O.C.G.A. § 1-3-1(b) (Supp. 2007).
213. 271 Ga. 587, 589, 523 S.E.2d 315, 317 (1999).
214. Adams, 284 Ga. App. at 542, 644 S.E.2d at 433 (Smith, J., concurring).
215. Id.
216. Id., 644 S.E.2d at 434.
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upon a witness's propensity to testify truthfully. '217 Because one can
knowingly receive stolen property and be honest about it-one may
receive a stolen four-wheeler, for example, know it to be stolen, and thus
be guilty of this crime, but may simultaneously always tell the truth
about it when asked-the majority's interpretation of this new impeachment statute seems to comport best with legislative intent and logic. The
interesting case will be the one in which theft is involved but it also
includes some form of deceit, such as theft by deception.2 18 No doubt
this issue will arise at some point.
VI.

SENTENCING-STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION

In Gillespie v. State,2 19 a question arose for the first time under
O.C.G.A. section 16-5-23(f),220 the family violence provision of the
simple battery statute, namely, whether a person could be sentenced for
this "high and aggravated" offense when the victim of the defendant's
battery is the defendant's girlfriend.221 At trial, the girlfriend mentioned that she had been pregnant by the defendant a few weeks before
the attack but was no longer pregnant and, moreover, that she had
never told the defendant that he had impregnated her.2 22 The statute
governing the offense of simple battery provides that family violence
simple battery should result in a misdemeanor sentence of a high and
aggravated nature.22 3 Family violence simple battery occurs between
"persons who are parents of the same child."224 The court of appeals
concluded that the legislature did not intend for the statute to encompass a relationship in which (1) a man and woman had sexual relations,
(2) the woman became pregnant but only a few weeks before the battery,
(3) the man did not know she was pregnant when he committed the
battery, and (4) the two of them had not lived together, as were the facts
in this case.225 Chief Judge Ruffin, the author of the opinion, applied
the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusio alterius, which means "that
when particular things are enumerated in a statute, things not
mentioned are excluded from application of the statute," to conclude that
the legislature could have included sexual partners on the list of familial
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Id. at 540, 644 S.E.2d at 432 (majority opinion).
See O.C.G.A. § 16-8-3 (2003).
280 Ga. App. 243, 633 S.E.2d 632 (2006).
O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23(f) (2007).
Gillespie, 280 Ga. App. at 243-44, 633 S.E.2d at 633.
Id. at 244, 633 S.E.2d at 633-34.
O.C.G.A § 16-5-23(f).
Id.
Gillespie, 280 Ga. App. at 245, 633 S.E.2d at 634.
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relationships but chose not to do so. 226 The case was remanded for resentencing
as a misdemeanor simple battery, not high and aggravated. 227
Judge Barnes concurred but wrote separately to employ a different
rule of statutory construction with the Latin name noscitur a sociis,
which says that "the meaning of a word is or may be known from
accompanying words."228 Being a parent is not the key, she observed;
"the essential thing here is the relationship." 229 The victim's pregnancy without the defendant's knowledge does not create the sort of
relationship, she wrote, intended by the legislature when writing this
Code section.23
Finally, Judge Bernes also concurred specially, likewise parting
company with the majority's statutory construction.231 In her view, the
court should have presumed that the legislature's failure to refer
specifically to unborn children or pregnancy in O.C.G.A. section 16-523(f) "was 'a matter of considered choice' ' 232 because the General
Assembly "'has indicated by specific language when it intends to include
unborn children within the contemplation of a criminal statute'' 23 3 and
because in another subsection of the simple battery statute-O.C.G.A.
section 16-5-23(c)-the legislature proscribes with an elevated punishment simple battery "'against a female who is pregnant at the time of

the offense.' "234
VII.
A.

APPELLATE ISSUES

State's Right to Appeal

1. Oral Order. The legislature gave the right to the State to
immediately appeal the granting of a defendant's motion to suppress by

226. Id. at 246, 633 S.E.2d at 635 (citing Long v. State, 271 Ga. App. 565, 569, 610
S.E.2d 74, 78 (2004)).
227. Id.
228. Id. at 247, 633 S.E.2d at 635 (Barnes, J., concurring) (citing Mott v. Cent. R.R.,
70 Ga. 680, 683 (1883), overruled on other grounds by Thompson v. Watson, 186 Ga. 396,
406-08, 197 S.E. 774, 779-80 (1938)).
229. Id.
230. Id.
231. Id. (Bernes, J., concurring).
232. Id. at 248, 633 S.E.2d at 636 (quoting Inland Paperboard & Packaging, Inc. v. Ga.
Dep't of Revenue, 247 Ga. App. 101, 104, 616 S.E.2d 873, 876 (2005)).
233. Id. at 247-48, 633 S.E.2d at 635-36 (quoting State v. Luster, 204 Ga. App. 156,
157, 419 S.E.2d 32, 34 (1992)).
234. Id. at 248, 633 S.E.2d at 636 (quoting O.C.G.A. § 16-5-23(c) (2003)).
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enacting O.C.G.A. section 5-7-1(a)(4).23 '
The right is immediate
because the State cannot appeal after an acquittal,23 6 and an immediate appeal allows the appellate courts to correct any potential miscarriage of justice if a trial judge has erroneously excluded evidence and has
left the State with no case. 37 Add to these basic rules the additional
rule that the State may not appeal an order to suppress evidence unless
the order is in writing,238 and we have the unique problem that arose
in State v. Morrell.23 s In Morrell the trial judge, the day before
Morrell's murder trial was to begin, granted Morrell's motion to exclude
a statement Morrell had given to the police. The judge, however, did not
reduce his order to writing. The State filed a notice of appeal from the
oral ruling and objected to the judge's decision to begin the trial anyway.
The trial proceeded to verdict, in which the jury acquitted Morrell. The
State then filed a notice of appeal from the judgment of acquittal.24 °
The supreme court recognized the position a trial judge can put the
State in by refusing to reduce an oral suppression order to writing and
acknowledged the injustice of it:
Given that the State cannot appeal after an acquittal and thus can
never seek to rectify an incorrect suppression order if a defendant is
acquitted, a trial court's refusal to put an order suppressing evidence
into writing defeats the heart of the legislature's intent of granting the
State a limited right of appeal and has the potential to exact grave
injustices.' 4'
Thus, the court concluded, the rule that the State may not appeal unless
the order has been reduced to writing is not absolute.2 42 But the court
narrowed its holding that the State may appeal oral orders granting
suppression to instances "only when the transcript affirmatively shows
that the State requested the trial court to put the oral order in written
form and that the trial court refused to do so." 243 In Morrell the State
failed to request a written order, so the State's appeal was dismissed.244
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O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(4) (1995 & Supp. 2007).
City of Atlanta v. McCary, 245 Ga. 582, 582, 266 S.E.2d 193, 193 (1980).
Strickman v. State, 253 Ga. 287, 288, 319 S.E.2d 864, 865 (1984).
Crowell v. State, 234 Ga. 313, 313, 215 S.E.2d 685, 685 (1975).
281 Ga. 152, 635 S.E.2d 716 (2006).
Id. at 152, 635 S.E.2d at 716.
Id. at 153, 635 S.E.2d at 717.
Id. at 152, 635 S.E.2d at 717.
Id. at 153, 635 S.E.2d at 717.
Id.
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What would happen, however, if the State requested a written order
when the trial court granted suppression, but the judge refused to do it?
Because the trial court has a duty to put its oral orders in writing upon
request,2 45 the transcript would reflect the trial court's refusal to do its
duty, which would then save the State's appeal from dismissal.2 46 The
court goes on to note that the State could have also filed a mandamus
petition seeking to require the trial court to put its order in writing, but
in light of language above in the opinion--"we find that the State has
the right to appeal oral orders only when the transcript affirmatively
shows that the State requested the trial court to put the oral order in
written form and that the trial court refused to do so" 2 47-filing a
mandamus does not seem to be necessary to preserve the issue for
appeal.
2. Order Granting Defendant's Motion for New Trial. In 2005
the legislature amended O.C.G.A. section 5-7-1(a)248 by adding the
words "a motion for new trial or" to the subsection that had previously
allowed the State to appeal from a grant of an extraordinary motion for
new trial only.249 The first appeal by the State under this amended
Code section came before the court of appeals in State v. McMillon.25 °
In that case, McMillon was convicted of involuntary manslaughter and
sentenced to serve ten years for pushing his wife into the path of an
oncoming car.251 On his motion for new trial, McMillon persuaded the
trial court that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because trial
counsel (1) failed to interview any of the State's witnesses, (2) did not
obtain taped interviews of the State's witnesses, (3) stipulated to the
admission of toxicology reports showing that McMillon and his wife both
tested positive for alcohol and cocaine metabolites but failed to
investigate whether either drug affected their ability to function, and (4)
failed to investigate or pursue the defense of accident, especially because
"evidence adduced at trial raised the possibility that McMillon had
Sheila was struck by the
thrown his shirt onto the highway and that
252
vehicle when she bent down to retrieve it."
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Titelman v. Stedman, 277 Ga. 460, 462, 591 S.E.2d 774, 776 (2003).
Morrell, 281 Ga. at 152, 635 S.E.2d at 717.
Id. at 153, 635 S.E.2d at 717.
O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a) (1995), amended by O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(7) (Supp. 2007).
O.C.G.A. § 5-7-1(a)(7) (Supp. 2007).
283 Ga. App. 671, 642 S.E.2d 343 (2007).
Id. at 671, 642 S.E.2d at 343.
Id. at 672, 642 S.E.2d at 344-45 (citing Cortez v. State, 253 Ga. App. 699, 704, 561
142, 148 (2002) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984))).
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The court applied "the same standard of review used in all cases
challenging the first grant of a motion for new trial. 253 That standard
is found at O.C.G.A. section 5-5-50,254 which states that "[tihe first
grant of a [motion for] new trial shall not be disturbed by an appellate
court unless the appellant shows that the judge abused his discretion in
granting it and that the law and facts require the verdict notwithstanding the judgment of the presiding judge."255 This case marks the first
time this standard has been applied to a criminal case.25 6
The court noted that its authority to reverse is greatly restricted
because "the trial judge is vested with the strongest of discretions to
review the case and to set the verdict aside if he is not satisfied with
it." 257 The rule is that "the first grant of a new trial to either party is
not to be reversed by an appellate court unless the verdict set aside by
the trial court was absolutely demanded. 255 In other words, unless
the guilty verdict against McMillon was absolutely demanded, the trial
court's grant of his motion for new trial should stand." 9 Because the
court of appeals agreed with the trial court that McMillon was denied
his constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel because of trial
counsel's poor representation, the guilty verdict was not absolutely
demanded. 21 McMillon met the two-prong test for showing ineffective
assistance of counsel: trial counsel displayed deficient performance and
the deficient performance caused prejudice to McMillon.26 ' Thus, the
trial court's grant of McMillon's motion for new trial was affirmed.262
3. Allegedly Void Sentence. For yet another case during this
period in which the State exercised its right to appeal a trial court's
favorable decision toward a defendant but lost, we include State v.
Carden2 3 because it points out an interesting difference between the
state and federal manner of rewarding a cooperating defendant in a drug
case. In federal law, a cooperating defendant must provide substantial
assistance in the investigation and prosecution of others before the
government will file a motion pursuant to United States Sentencing
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Id. at 671, 642 S.E.2d at 344.
O.C.G.A. § 5-5-50 (1995).
Id.
McMillon, 283 Ga. App. at 671, 642 S.E.2d at 344.
Id.
Id. at 671-72, 642 S.E.2d at 344.
See id.
Id. at 672, 642 S.E.2d at 344.
Id.
Id. at 673, 642 S.E.2d at 345.
281 Ga. App. 886, 637 S.E.2d 493 (2006).
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Guidelines section 5K1.1264 for a downward adjustment of that defendant's sentence.2 65 While the final decision whether to grant the
motion and how much to adjust the sentence rests with the judge, the
initial decision to submit the defendant's cooperation to the judge for
leniency rests with the government and only the government.2 66 The
defendant is prohibited from moving for a sentence reduction based upon
substantial assistance.26 7
Compare that scheme to O.C.G.A. section 16-13-31(g)(2),268 which
states:
The district attorney may move the sentencing court to impose a
reduced or suspended sentence upon any person who is convicted of a
violation of this Code section and who provides substantial assistance
in the identification, arrest, or conviction of any of his accomplices,
accessories, coconspirators, or principals. Upon good cause shown, the
motion may be filed and heard in camera. The judge hearing the
motion may impose a reduced or suspended sentence if he finds that
the defendant has rendered such substantial assistance. 9
While the statute is silent regarding the defendant's right to make such
a motion when the district attorney refuses to do so, the Georgia
Supreme Court, unlike federal law, has held that the defendant may
make such a motion to the court.270
In Carden the State enumerated as error on appeal the trial court's
reduction of Carden's sentence because the judge gave her a sentence of
ten years, with five to serve in prison and five to serve on probation,
despite the fact that the drug statute under which she was convicted-O.C.G.A. section 16-13-31(e)(1)-calls for mandatory minimum ten
years to serve with no probation available. 271 The State alleged that
the law does not allow a sentence below the mandatory minimum and
alleged that the trial judge's true motive in giving the reduced sentence

264. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K1.1.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. Id.
268. O.C.G.A. § 16-13-31(g)(2) (2007).
269. Id.
270. Brugman v. State, 255 Ga. 407, 414, 339 S.E.2d 244, 251 (1986).
[We hold that where any person is convicted under [O.C.G.A. section] 16-13-31,
and provides "substantial assistance" to the authorities as contemplated by the
statute, this information may be brought to the attention of the sentencing court
by motion of either the district attorney or the defendant, or the sentencing court
may make its own inquiry into the matter.

Id.
271.

Carden, 281 Ga. App. at 889, 637 S.E.2d at 497.
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was not because he believed that Carden had provided substantial
assistance-the State argued that she had failed in this regard because
all she did was provide the name of her supplier on the day of her
arrest, nothing more-but because of the judge's "personal disdain of
mandatory minimum sentencing provisions."272 The court first held
that O.C.G.A. section 16-13-31(g)(2) allows a judge to reduce a sentence
for substantial assistance, even if that reduction takes the sentence
below the mandatory minimum.2 73 The court then held that the trial
court stated the judge's findings of substantial assistance as the reason
for the reduction, and because this finding was supported by the
evidence at the sentencing hearing, the State's appeal was dismissed.274
VIII.

CONCLUSION

Criminal law, like law generally, evolves with the changing standards
of the times. The exclusionary rule, for example, has never been fully
appreciated by the general public but has been safeguarded by our
courts since its introduction as a remedy for the abrogation of a citizen's
rights to privacy, to silence, and to counsel. We saw those rights
preserved in several opinions this year. We all benefit from vigilant
lawyers who raise issue after issue in hundreds of cases every year to
preserve in a meaningful way the cherished fundamental liberties that
make our criminal justice system unique in the history of the world.

272. Id. at 890, 637 S.E.2d at 497. Concerning mandatory minimums, the judge stated
at sentencing: "'I hate them. Every judge hates them to the bottom of [their] shoes."' Id.
We may state, with Judge Howe, the sentencing judge in this case, that we hate them too,
as does every criminal defense lawyer we know. Mandatory minimums are politically
popular, but the cost is excessive, and not just the cost in incarcerating more people for
longer periods, but the cost to the integrity and independence of the judicial branch of
government when judges are stripped of their ability to apply their own wisdom and sense
of proportionality to sentencing the individuals who come before them.
273. Id.
274. Id. at 886, 637 S.E.2d at 495.

